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Portuguese ‘discovery’, French colonisation and British treaty dealings. Plantation 
and extraction. Racial capitalism and slave labour. Coercion and partition. Imperial 
alliance and militarisation. Displacement and exile. The story of the Chagos 
archipelago is a familiar one in the history of international law and relations 
between peoples. It is indicative of international law’s complicity in European 
oppression and dispossession of colonised peoples and places. Yet while much of 
the machinations of colonial rule were spannered – at least nominally in the form 
of sovereignty-as-independence – by the national liberation movements of the 20th 
century, the Chagos travesty persists into our 21st century colonial present. Britain’s 
refusal to let go of the small group of faraway islands serves as a contradictory 
symbol of both its self-deluding pretensions of empire on one hand, and its self-
abasing servitude to United States imperialism on the other. It reminds us that 
colonialism is still very much with us, and that self-determination remains 
contingent. International law’s ode to sovereign equality and territorial integrity is 
as much about concealing its own colonial foundations as it is about delivering on 
a promise of liberation. 
In February 2019, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an 
advisory opinion to confirm in law what we knew already as a matter of social and 
political and material reality: the British state had wrongfully kept control of the 
Chagos islands after Mauritius asserted its independence, and the process of 
decolonisation there is not yet complete. The core finding of the Court was that 
that Britain ‘has an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos 
Archipelago as rapidly as possible’.1 On the face of it, this is a solid confirmation 
of international law’s belated but definitive prohibition of colonialism. And yet we 
can also read the judgment as ringing somewhat hollow. 
~ 
1960 was the high-water mark of formal decolonisation, before the swift 
tightening of ‘the grip of neo-colonialism’ 2  and the restructured economic 
subjugation of the Third World. That year, 468 long years after Columbus claimed 
the island of Guanahani for the Spanish royals and set in chain a sequence of events 
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whereby the veins of multiple continents were cut open and ‘transmuted into 
European capital’ 3 , the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 1514. 
Colonialism ‘in all its forms and manifestations’ (bar the small matter of settler 
colonies that had reconstituted themselves as sovereign states) was prohibited. Any 
attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of any country was deemed incompatible with the purposes and principles 
of the UN Charter. Seventeen newly independent states joined the UN in 1960 and 
the Third World bloc became the majority in the General Assembly.  
‘Existing colonies may linger on’, Nkrumah wrote in 1965, ‘but no new 
colonies will be created’.4 Fading empires like Britain – and newer imperial powers 
like the US – were all too conscious of this. That same year, the British government 
orchestrated a way to carve a lingering colony out of the existing-but-not-for-too-
much-longer colony of Mauritius. By this time, the idea of territorial and military 
bases in relatively unpopulated areas was particularly appealing to Western powers. 
The “strategic island concept” being pursued by the US in particular sought to 
locate uninhabited island bases as a way to bypass rising anti-imperial sentiment 
around the globe. The potential of Chagos was clear: military planners would be 
‘thrilled at the idea of a base with no civilian population within almost 500 miles’, 
and indeed ‘planning between the British and U.S. governments had been 
underway since at least 1964’.5 Britain’s task was, so to speak, to make Chagos terra 
nullius again. This would involve removing the Chagossians – Creole-speaking 
people descended from African slaves and indentured labourers – who had been 
inhabiting the islands for 200 years. 
Through coercive means, the British government imposed the Lancaster 
House “agreement” on leaders of the Mauritius Council of Ministers to partition 
the colony and excise the Chagos archipelago as part of a newly constructed 
‘British Indian Ocean Territory’ in 1965. No more than four days later, the Colonial 
Office sent instructions to the administration of this new territory stating that 
‘contingency planning for evacuation of existing population…should begin at 
once’6. In the lead-up to Mauritian independence in 1968, Britain began displacing 
the Chagossians from their archipelago: preventing those who travelled from 
returning, and forcibly removing others. Archive documentation has shown that 
the Foreign Office consistently lied about this during these years. For fear of being 
called out by the Committee of Twenty-Four (the UN Special Committee on 
Decolonisation), legal advisor Anthony Aust recommended that British officials 
‘maintain the fiction that the inhabitants of Chagos are not a permanent or semi-
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permanent population’ but rather itinerant workers with no connection to the 
islands.7 Diplomatic correspondence from August 1966 is revealing of the attitudes 
prevalent in the colonial view of Chagos and its people. Paul Gore-Booth, 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office wrote: ‘We must surely 
be very tough about this. The object of the exercise was to get some rocks which 
will remain ours; there will be no indigenous population except seagulls who have 
not yet got a Committee (the Status of Women does not cover the rights of Birds).’ 
His colleague Denis Greenhill added: ‘Unfortunately along with the birds go some 
few Tarzans or Men Fridays whose origins are obscure, and who are being 
hopefully wished on to Mauritius etc. When this has been done I agree we must 
be very tough’.8  
In December 1966, Britain leased the largest of the Chagos islands, Diego 
Garcia, to the US for the establishment of a naval and military base. International 
law facilitated this in an international treaty between the two, 9  under which 
sovereignty over the territory was retained by Britain but competence for its 
administration was transferred to the US. There was no direct payment for the 
lease; instead the US contributed to the administrative costs of establishing the 
new colonial territory (‘diplomatic legalese for the costs of deporting the 
Chagossians, buying out the plantation owners, and paying off Mauritius and the 
Seychelles’10) and gave Britain a discount on the Polaris nuclear submarine ballistic 
missile system. The Chagossians were entirely absent from these arrangements, 
and the assumption underlying the agreement was that they would be entirely 
absent from the archipelago. Construction of the military base began in 1971, at 
which time forced expulsions ramped up, and between 1971 and 1973 the 
remaining inhabitants were put onto cargo ships and deported to Mauritius and 
the Seychelles. Just before the final deportations, ‘British agents and U.S. troops 
on Diego Garcia herded the Chagossians' pet dogs into sealed sheds and gassed 
and burned them in front of their traumatized owners’.11  
Since then, all human and economic activity in the Chagos archipelago has 
been concentrated in the military facilities on Diego Garcia. There has been no 
functioning agriculture on the islands. The Chagossians remain exiled but have 
continued a campaign to return. They plan to re-establish their lives and livelihoods 
there through fishing and coconut copra production. In recent years, much of the 
energy of this struggle has been supported by litigation – for return of the 
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Chagossians, and for the archipelago to be reunified with Mauritius. In 2000, the 
High Court in Britain ruled that the 1965 colonial ordinance used as the basis to 
deport the islanders was unlawful. Instead of complying with the judgement and 
allowing them to return, Tony Blair’s government issued an Order-in-Council to 
explicitly bar the Chagossians from re-inhabiting the archipelago. This was again 
challenged in the courts, but this time ultimately approved in 2008 by the House 
of Lords.12 In 2012, the European Court of Human Rights also rejected a case 
brought by 1,786 Chagossians against Britain as inadmissible; the Court felt it did 
not have jurisdiction over a colonial territory to which Britain had not actively 
extended its European human rights law obligations.13 So the Chagossians and 
Mauritius looked to international courts beyond the national and regional domain 
of the colonial power.  
In 2015, an arbitral tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled 
that the Chagos ‘Marine Protected Area’ which Britain had created in 2010 
(publicly for conservation purposes but actually, in confidence, ‘to assure that U.S. 
interests were safeguarded’, ‘to get through the various Chagossian lobbies’, to ‘put 
paid to resettlement claims’ and make it ‘difficult, if not impossible’ for the 
Chagossians to return14) violates international law.15 It also ruled that Britain does 
have obligations towards Mauritius over the return of the archipelago, but only 
when it is no longer needed for defence purposes. This left enough space for the 
British Foreign Office to announce in 2016 that ‘the government has decided 
against resettlement of the Chagossian people’ – on grounds that it would be 
expensive and impractical – and that, with the initial 50-year lease period expiring 
in December 2016, the agreement with the US would be extended: ‘In an 
increasingly dangerous world, the defence facility is used by us and our allies to 
combat some of the most difficult problems of the 21st century including 
terrorism, international criminality, instability and piracy. I can today confirm that 
the UK continues to welcome the US presence, and that the agreements will 
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continue as they stand until 30 December 2036.’16 Within a month of this extension 
kicking in, the African Union resolved to work to ensure ‘the completion of the 
decolonization of the Republic of Mauritius’.17 
And so, to the ICJ. In June 2017, after many iterations over the years of 
UN General Assembly, African Union and Non-Aligned Movement 
condemnation of British policy on Chagos, the General Assembly requested the 
Court’s advisory opinion on the questions of: (i) whether the process of 
decolonisation of Mauritius was lawfully completed when Mauritius gained 
independence in 1968 following the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from 
Mauritius; and (ii) what the consequences are under international law arising from 
the continued administration of the Chagos Archipelago by Britain, including with 
respect to the resettlement of the Chagossians.18 The resolution was carried by the 
global South, with many European countries opting to abstain and a smallish 
collection of states voting with Britain against the move. 
~ 
The history of international law is a history of unequal relations. In 
the Chagos proceedings at the ICJ, a number of Third World states made 
representations about the unequal nature of treaties imposed by colonial powers 
on representatives of the colony prior to independence. They noted the structural 
biases in favour of colonial states as a persistent feature of international treaties. 
While this was hardwired into international law historically, the argument is that 
this was no longer valid by the time of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties in the late 1960s: ‘one could hardly deny that treaties dictated by the 
stronger to the weaker party would qualify as unequal treaties. This idea of 
inequality has been recognized and has played a crucial role in the development of 
international law.’19  
In 1964, the Committee of Twenty-Four made clear its opinion that the 
constitutional arrangements in Mauritius ‘do not allow the representatives of the 
people to exercise real legislative or executive powers, and that authority is nearly 
all concentrated in the hands of the United Kingdom Government and its 
representatives.’20 The advisory opinion narrates the story of the Lancaster House 
agreement from there. The Colonial Office and the Governor of Mauritius 
informed the native Council of Ministers and the Premier of their proposal to 
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constitutionally sever the Chagos archipelago from the rest of Mauritius. The 
Council of Ministers opposed this. Britain’s Foreign Secretary and Defence 
Secretary said that if Mauritius would not agree, they would have to implement a 
‘forcible detachment’. The counter-offer made by the Premier of Mauritius was 
that Britain should first concede independence to Mauritius, including sovereignty 
over Chagos, and then the Mauritian Government could negotiate with the Britain 
and the US on the question of Diego Garcia. The Brits were not open to this. In 
planning a meeting with the Premier of Mauritius, the aim of the British Prime 
Minister was to: ‘frighten him with hope: hope that he might get independence; 
Fright lest he might not unless he is sensible about the detachment of the Chagos 
Archipelago.’21 Judge Robinson cites a subsequent comment from the Premier: 
‘There was a noose around my neck. I could not say no. I had to say yes, otherwise 
the [noose] could have tightened.’22 
 And so it was. Amputating Chagos was the price of Mauritian 
independence. The ICJ, while not casting it explicitly in terms of coercion or 
duress, concluded that this was illegitimate: ‘heightened scrutiny should be given 
to the issue of consent in a situation where a part of a non-self-governing territory 
is separated to create a new colony’ – and in this specific situation ‘detachment was 
not based on the free and genuine expression of the will of the people concerned.’23 
On that foundation, the Court makes a series of short, snappy steps from 
the applicable law to its main findings: the right of peoples to self-determination 
was established as a normative principle of customary international law by 1965; 
state practice and opinio juris at the time confirmed that respect for the territorial 
integrity of a non self-self-governing territory was a key element of self-
determination; the General Assembly has important functions in overseeing the 
implementation of self-determination in the context of decolonisation; because the 
Chagos archipelago was an integral part of the non-self-governing territory of 
Mauritius and was illegitimately separated in 1965, the process of decolonisation 
of Mauritius was not lawfully complete when the rest of the territory became 
independent in 1968; Britain’s continuing administration of the territory is an 
internationally wrongful act which must be ended as quickly as possible, and all 
members states must cooperate with the UN to complete the decolonisation of 
Mauritius.24  
This is all well and good in terms of the Court’s baseline commitment to 
self-determination and the upshot that the colonial protagonist here ‘totally lost 
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the case. There’s no silver lining’.25 The brevity of the opinion’s reasoning on the 
substance and its lack of engagement with some of the arguments made in state 
submissions, however, leaves a sense of hollowness. It exposes the opinion to both 
doctrinal objections and deeper critique. On the question of whether self-
determination was already a rule of customary international law by the period 
between 1965 and 1968, for example, it has been suggested that ‘the Court 
completely fudges it’ by making a ‘plain assertion’ unsupported by sufficient 
evidence of state practice or opinio juris.26 From a more critical perspective, the 
weight given in the first place to a traditional conception of customary international 
law highlights the very ‘nature and politics of “custom” as a continuing source of 
international law’, which, with its twin requirements of attesting “state practice” 
and “opinio juris” has facilitated and advanced the imperial order.’27 B.S. Chimni 
has illustrated that the historic role of customary international law ‘has been to 
facilitate the functioning of global capitalist system by filling crucial gaps in the 
international legal system’ – gaps relating to either short term interests of capitalist 
states or the systemic interests of the global capitalist system. 28  While very 
definitively linking (or, some argue, ‘shrinking’ 29 ) self-determination to 
decolonisation, the advisory opinion does little to advance the more radical, 
humane, “postmodern” conceptualisation of customary international law that 
Chimni suggests. 30  The African Union submissions also gave the court the 
opportunity to (re)develop in the interests of the Third World the doctrine of 
specially-affected states (“concerned states”) as an essential component of 
determining customary international law: ‘There is no doubt that those who are 
the concerned States in the present proceeding are, first and foremost, the African 
States and then those states that have been victims of colonialism (most of whom 
are part of the Non-Aligned Movement)’.31 But again the Court sidesteps this 
opportunity. 
Ultimately, the advisory opinion pushes up against the limitations imposed 
by international law’s state-centricity. The Chagossians themselves remain 
somewhat peripheral. A few of the separate opinions do make the point that the 
Court does not do enough to account for their human and material experience. 
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And Judges Robinson and Cançado Trindade both write the testimony of Liseby 
Elysé into their opinions, giving voice to her personal experience as illustrative of 
the voice of the colonised and the plight of the Chagossians.32 This is necessarily 
an individual testimony, however, not the type of ‘powerful collective 
representations’ which have solicited powerful support for the Chagossian cause 
but which do not fit the ‘more positivistic understanding of history imposed by 
formal concepts of legal evidence.’33  
Beyond this, the core focus of the advisory opinion, by virtue of 
international law’s traditions and structures, is overwhelmingly on Mauritius’s 
territorial sovereignty rather than the Chagossians’ right to return. Even with the 
restoration of Mauritian sovereignty over the archipelago and the completion of 
the process of decolonisation from the perspective of international law as the 
Court sees it, the fate of the people and ecology of Chagos remains contingent on 
the priorities of (and pressures on) the state of Mauritius. The substantive findings 
section of the Court’s advisory opinion devotes just a single sentence to the 
uprooted Chagossians.34  It casts their situation as a human rights issue which 
should be considered in the General Assembly’s work subsequent to the advisory 
opinion, but which is beyond the scope of the ICJ itself. Cançado Trindade’s 
discussion of the 1955 Bandung conference35 – and his reference to the collection 
of essays that a substantial number of TWAIL-oriented scholars contributed to36 – 
is a welcome acknowledgment of the role that the Third World played in 
influencing international law and the UN at the time. But it is also emblematic of 
the deficiencies of international law – even that shaped by Bandung – in being able 
to adequately address the Chagos situation. The pluralism of Bandung and the 
Non-Aligned Movement ultimately meant that in the distillation of the “spirit of 
Bandung” into doctrinal positions, the more radical strands of Third Worldist 
thought and praxis were filtered out, and the core focus was a statist one 
preoccupied with national political independence and territorial sovereignty. 
~ 
In April 2019, the British Foreign Office responded to the ICJ’s findings with a 
confident, if unsubstantiated, rebuttal: ‘The Government has considered the 
content of the Opinion carefully, however we do not share the Court’s 
approach…we have no doubt about our sovereignty over the Chagos 
 
32 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Robinson (25 February 2019), para. 104; Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 219. 
33 Laura Jeffery, ‘How a Plantation became Paradise: Changing Representations of the Homeland among 
Displaced Chagos Islanders’ (2007) 13:4 Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 951-968. 
34 Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago, para. 181. 
35 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Cançado Trindade (25 February 2019) paras. 43-49. 
36  Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah (eds.), Bandung, Global History, and International Law - Critical 
Pasts and Pending Futures (Cambridge University Press, 2017).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3624296
Archipelago’.37 A former empire remains happily ensconced in its global board-
game activities, with real-world consequences. Its statement to the UN General 
Assembly in May 2019 reveals a continuing belief in the validity of its own self-
appointment as global police force: ‘In this important part of the world, the joint 
United Kingdom and United States defence facility on the British Indian Ocean 
Territory plays a vital role in our efforts to keep our allies and friends, including 
Mauritius, in the region, and beyond, safe and secure.’38 The General Assembly 
voted that day to welcome the ICJ advisory opinion and demand that Britain 
‘withdraw its colonial administration unconditionally within a period of no more 
than six months’.39 116 member states voted in favour of the resolution, with just 
six voting against. Five of them – Britain, the US, Israel, Australia and Hungary – 
form a type of settler-colonial/white-nationalist alliance that is reminiscent of the 
‘unholy alliance between Portuguese colonialism, South African racism and Israeli 
imperialism’ which the General Assembly used to condemn in the 1970s.40 (The 
sixth, the Maldives, defends its vote as seeking to protect itself against a potential 
reduction in its Exclusive Economic Zone in the Indian Ocean, which could occur 
if sovereignty over Chagos was returned to Mauritius before pending claims over 
the maritime boundaries between the two states are resolved). Six months later, in 
November 2019, Britain had not withdrawn its colonial administration, and was 
described by commentators as ‘a rogue state’.41 
~ 
There has been much talk in recent years of the imperatives of decolonising 
– “decolonising the university”, “decolonising dialectics”, “decolonising 
international law”, and so on. This work of ‘decolonising’ as reimagining or 
restructuring is vital – if not always rooted in material struggles in the colonised 
world, and perhaps sometimes better not labelled as decolonisation. In sites where 
colonial rule and occupation continues, or where Indigenous peoples struggle 
against settler colonial structures and suffocation, decolonisation is not a 
metaphor.42 In 1965, while the fate of the Chagos archipelago and its people was 
being altered by imperial coercion, across the continent Amílcar Cabral was 
appealing to his revolutionary party (under Portuguese rule in Guinea and Cape 
Verde) to be wary of seeing decolonisation as simply the liberation of the mind: 
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41 Rachael Kennedy, ‘UK labelled 'rogue state' after missing UN deadline to hand Chagos Islands back to 
Mauritius’, EuroNews, 22 November 2019. 
42 Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, ‘Decolonization is Not a Metaphor’ (2012) 1:1 Decolonization: Indigeneity, 
Education & Society 1-40. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3624296
‘Always bear in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for the things in 
anyone’s head. They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in 
peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children.’43 For 
the Chagossians, these material benefits and these futures are wrapped up in their 
bond with the lands and waters of the archipelago. Decolonisation is inseparable 
from their right to return. The ICJ advisory opinion’s deflection of the question of 
their return is telling. The opinion fails to factor that – just as their removal was 
essential to the latest stage of imperialism in the archipelago – their return is 
intrinsic to the process of decolonisation, not an ancillary element to be negotiated. 
The scale and significance of the US war base operation on Diego Garcia 
since its establishment cannot be underestimated: billions invested in the largest 
build-up of any location after the Vietnam War; lucrative contracts for private 
military contractors; nuclear-capable bombers and likely nuclear weapons storage; 
NASA facilities and electro-optical deep space surveillance systems; pivotal 
wartime functions in the first Gulf War, the war on Afghanistan and the 2003 
invasion of Iraq; site of rendition flight stop-offs, clandestine “black site” 
detentions and possibly ‘secret prison ships’ in the waters of the archipelago.44 It is 
‘the single most important military facility we’ve got…the base from which we 
control half of Africa and the southern side of Asia’, according to US military 
specialists.45 Since the ICJ advisory opinion came down, the realpolitik pragmatism 
espoused in establishment circles has returned to the fore. Channelling the logic of 
“there is no alternative”, this position assumes that the Diego Garcia base will 
remain and that Mauritius will acquiesce. As one former diplomat puts it: 
‘Eventually, the issue of sovereignty will have to be finessed by agreements that 
allow continuation of the military base at Diego Garcia with guarantees that 
Mauritius will retain sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago. Mauritius will agree 
to lease out the island for a long period to the U.S. for maintaining the military 
base.’46 As it stands, the US position remains that, for security reasons, the Chagos 
archipelago must not be inhabited. The structures of the international economic 
order ensure that unequal relations continue, and that global North powers can get 
much of what they want by incentive and coercion.  
Cabral’s warnings of the dangers of neo-colonialism are prescient here. He 
conceptualises the liberation of a people in terms of ‘the regaining of the historical 
personality of that people, its return to history through the destruction of the 
imperialist domination to which it was subjected…for us the basis of national 
liberation, whatever the formulas adopted on the level of international law, is the inalienable 
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right of every people to have its own history’. Given ‘the essential characteristics 
of the present world economy’ and the ‘experiences already gained in the field of 
anti-imperialist struggle’, the principal struggle is against neo-colonialism.47 For 
Cabral, anti-colonialism must be an interruption of the colonial practices and 
structures that have been imposed. A process of decolonisation that leaves an 
imperial military base intact will remain incomplete, even if sovereignty is 
transferred from one state to another. In this sense, the struggle for the abolition 
of the Diego Garcia base and for the people’s return to Chagos is part of a broader 
struggle to (re)make the world anew – a struggle to claim the future, to restore local 
economies and ecologies in place of global war-game capitalism. This will be a 
constant struggle. Decolonisation and social emancipation, as Galeano reminds us, 
must be built with convincing strategy and clenched teeth: ‘after all, if the future 
came on a platter, it would not be of this world.’48 
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